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EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING 
SYSTEM APPLICATION TO NON-EU AIRLINES 
A. Benito (Polytechnic University of Madrid) 
ABSTRACT 
The European Union requires the application of an Emission Trading System (ETS) to all the 
flights arriving to or departing from EU airports beginning on 1st of January 2012, according 
to the rules published in the Directive 2008/101/EC. Although actual emissions trading will 
take place in 2012 and on, part of the regulation started to be applicable in January 2010, in 
order to gather airline data that will be used for distribution of free emissions permits and for 
establishing the number of permits to be auctioned. 
 
EU carriers will have almost every flight included in the ETS, but non EU airlines participation 
will be limited to flights touching one EU airport, representing a relatively small part of their 
route system. However they are subject to the same administrative requirements, being 
obliged to submit Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) procedures to the EU 
Authority corresponding to the country with the most emissions from that carrier. 
 
This paper explores some of the most likely consequences for non EU carriers, coming from 
the entry into force of the ETS, both during 2010 and after 1st of January 2012, when the 
system will start to be applicable. These effects may be classified in six categories: 
- strategies to obtain the maximum  number of free permits in the first distribution, 
to be made on 2010 traffic basis 
- participation in the CO2 auctioning or other carbon markets elements, as a way to 
obtain additional permits when needed 
- other Kyoto Protocol tools for achieving additional permits (Joint Implementation, 
Clean Development Mechanisms) 
- fuel savings policies to minimise the number of permits needed since 2012 
- new schemes for route evaluation, considering the repercussions of ETS 
- general planning (fleet and network) including carbon accounting 
 
As a conclusion it is shown that ETS application will have some unavoidable economic 
penalties and a non desirable administrative burden but, may offer a number of possibilities 
for minimising the negative effects of those measures and obtaining competitive advantages 
if airlines take early measures and elaborate the planning tools with enough anticipation. 
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1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The European Union (EU) adopted an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2003 (ref. [1]) as 
the most cost efficient market mechanism, intended for optimizing the cost of reducing 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from different industrial sectors (energy generation, oil 
refining, steel industry, timber, cement and ceramic, paper), all of them coming from fixed 
sources and representing roughly 50% of European emissions. The EU ETS started on 1st of 
January, 2005, with the purpose of helping EU Member States to comply with the target 
established in the Kyoto Protocol for the EU as a whole (a reduction of 8% GHG emissions in 
2012 with respect to the 1990 levels). Each country was assigned an individual goal, 
according with its present emission levels, the aggregation of which, leads to the global 8% 
reduction target. 
 
Kyoto Protocol defines six substances as GHGs: CO2, methane, N2O, HFC, PFC and SF6. 
Among them, aviation only emits CO2 although other emissions like NO2, water vapour and 
particles might act as precursors of different elements that contribute to climate warming, like 
ozone or clouds (ref. [2]). Due to the high level of scientific incertitude still existing with 
respect to the nature and magnitude of these other effects, all the actions taken up to this 
moment to limit the impact of aviation on climatic change refer only to the CO2 emissions, 
that represent about 2% of world man-made CO2 and about 12% of world transport CO2 
emissions. 
 
The major difference between industrial and transportation emissions, at the moment of 
allocating them to the inventory of a specific state, is mobility. The Kyoto Protocol worked on 
the principle that emissions from fixed sources will be attributed to the country where they 
were produced, independently of the nationality of the company. Transportation emissions 
followed the same concept in the trips moving across a single country, but there was no 
agreement on how to assign emissions of international travel, when the vehicle was going 
through different states. The so called bunker fuels burn by international aviation and 
shipping companies were left out of the Protocol mandate. 
  
As international civil flight emissions, on the contrary than domestic ones, were not included 
in the Kyoto Protocol, but left in the hands of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), this body initiated different analysis to determine the best way to control the 
emissions produced by those flights on a worldwide basis. In the ICAO 37th General 
Assembly, held in September-October 2007, some recommendations on market based 
measures were adopted, outlining Emissions Trading as the most efficient way forward in 
terms of environmental cost/benefit analysis, after evaluations comparing the potential of this 
tool versus voluntary agreements, environmental charges and taxes. 
 
However, it was not possible to reach an agreement on a worldwide system for emissions 
trading in the international aviation sector and the European Union decided to take the 
initiative of including the civil flights making a stop at its airports in the already working 
European Emissions Trading Scheme. An evaluation of possible European strategies to fight 
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aviation GHG, reinforcing the findings of ICAO that point out Emission Trading as the one 
having the minimum cost/benefits results, is included as ref. [3]. 
 
On legal grounds, the European action creates some doubts to the international aviation law 
experts. A number of non EU countries are complaining against the inclusion of non EU 
operators in the system, pointing out that the ICAO recommendation on emissions trading 
systems requires State level agreement for its application. In December 2009, three US 
airlines (American, Continental and United) launched a legal challenge to the rule in a British 
Court that, if successful, might modify the reach of the rule. 
 
On November 18, 2008 Directive 2008/101/EC, in ref. [4], was approved, amending the 
existing ETS Directive (2003/87/EC), with the purpose of adding civil aviation to the sectors 
allowed to trade CO2 emission permits. The amended Directive considers EU civil aviation as 
a whole sector where operators (commercial airlines or other aircraft users) are the subject of 
emission limits and, therefore, the entities allowed to trade permits, starting on January 1, 
2012. The maximum level of emissions (the cap of the trading system) is established at 97% 
of the historical emissions, to be understood as the average of the annual CO2 emissions in 
the calendar years 2004, 2005 and 2006 from aircraft performing an aviation activity included 
in the amended Directive. After reserving a 3% of the permits for protecting new entrants or 
operators with a high level of growth, the rest of the emissions cap will originate an 
equivalent amount of permits, to be distributed for free among the operators, proportionally to 
their Revenue Ton-kilometers (RTK) performed in the year 2010. The 97% cap will pass to 
be 95% in 2013. The long term objective is a continuous reduction of the cap until reaching a 
situation with no free permit at all, always as a single sector, independent of national goals. 
 
This system will have important economic repercussions for the affected operators. Those 
emitting more than their free permit quotas in 2012 and beyond, will be forced to buy 
additional permits in the open market to compensate the exceeded amount. On the contrary, 
if an operator emits less than its quota, the operator is allowed to sell the unused permits and 
make a profit. Then, the calculation of historical emissions plays a key role in the efficiency of 
the system. If the number is too small, the amount of distributed emission allowances would 
be insufficient and there would be a high demand for purchasing permits, which price would 
increase with heavy financial effects on the operators’ economy. However, an over-estimate 
of the historical emissions might put in danger the environmental impact of the regulation, 
demanding very minor actions for compliance by the individual carriers. 
 
The high volatility level of emission permit prices, caused by inaccurate calculation of the 
needs of the different economic sectors at the initial phase of ETS application, and by the 
speculative movements of investing banks in the world stock markets, has made very difficult 
calculate a global cost for the airline industry. A forecast placed in the middle between the 
most extreme pessimistic and optimistic predictions would be in the order of 30,000 million 
euro in the 2012 – 2021 period, with a continuous increase from a low figure of 1,000 M€ in 
2012 up to almost 6,000 M€ in 2021, with a large majority of those amounts paid by the EU 
airlines. 
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2. STRATEGIES TO OBTAIN FREE PERMITS 
The mechanism for the distribution of the free permits is based in two groups of data: 
- the historical emissions calculation, which has been tasked to the European 
Traffic Control Organisation (EUROCONTROL), and it is expected to be 
published soon 
- the amount of RTK performed and reported by the individual airlines during the 
year 2010, according to the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) plans 
submitted to the competent Authorities 
 
Competent Authority means the national administration body designated by each EU State to 
control the process. Although the permit distribution is a competence of the European 
Commission, individual States must take care of MRV plans approval and execution, 
including the auditing of the data and operational procedures and the possible penalties on 
the non complying airlines included in its inventory. The airlines to be controlled by an EU 
state are included in a list, approved and published by the European Commission. A draft 
version of the list appeared on March 2009, having suffered several amendments before its 
first official publication in August 2009. The most recent and definitive, at least until this 
moment, was issued in January 2010 (ref. [5]). 
 
The procedure for determining the allocation of an operator to a state is developed and 
executed by EUROCONTROL, having into account the calculation of CO2 emissions of each 
airline flights to and from the European territory as is indicated in ref. [6]. Each state takes 
controls its own airlines plus non EU airlines emitting the highest quantity of CO2 in the flights 
to that country. Logically large countries receive higher number of operators, mostly grouped 
by historical affinities: the majority of US airlines are allocated to the United Kingdom, most 
former Soviet Union members to Germany and almost all Latin American companies to 
Spain. 
 
The Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) process is an adaptation of the regulatory 
framework adopted for other industrial sectors included in the European ETS. It was 
enforced by a Commission regulation as in ref. [7]. Operators not included in the low emitter 
exemptions must establish a documented and audited procedure to account and report the 
amount of kerosene consumed and the RTK performed by city pair of the routes to the EU 
airports. The regulation indicates different ways of compliance with this requisite, with the 
purpose of reducing the interferences with the carrier statistics, avoiding an excessive 
administrative burden and minimising the compliance cost. 
 
In April 2011, the European Commission will grant to each participating airline a number of 
permits, equivalent to the number of CO2 ton that airline will be allowed to emit at no charge 
in its 2012 flights to the EU territory. The permit attribution will follow the formula: 
 
                                    Na2012 = 0.82 HE x (RTKa2010 / ∑RTKi2010)                                          (1) 
 
where: Na2012 is the number of free permits for airline a in the year 2012 
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HE is the average number of CO2 ton calculated by EUROCONTROL 
RTKa2010 the number of Revenue Ton-Kilometre performed by airline a flights 
touching EU territory in 2010 
∑RTKi2010 the total number of Revenue Ton-Kilometre performed by all the operators  
included in EU ETS in 2010 
 
The CO2 emissions of a flight are directly proportional to its fuel consumption. An 
overwhelming majority of the aircraft affected by the EU ETS is consuming kerosene type 
fuel, specifications Jet A and Jet A1 and the Directive establishes an emission factor of 3.15 
kg of CO2 per kilogram of kerosene. As the ETS will start in the year 2012, by April 2013 
each airline must deliver a number of permits equal to its fuel consumption in tons, multiplied 
by 3.15, corresponding to its 2012 flights in and out the EU. 
  
It is interesting to notice that, for this first distribution, fuel efficiency plays no role and the 
only important variable is the market share of individual airlines in terms of RTK. 
Notwithstanding, the compensation of the actual emissions in 2012 of the permits granted on 
2010 RTK bases favors the most fuel efficient airlines in 2012, with the lowest fuel 
consumption per RTK ratio. This benchmarking distribution tries to incentivize fuel efficiency 
in aggregate figures but does not recognize the differences between particular features of 
each specific network, like average stage length, infrastructure conditions or meteorology, 
which have a relevant influence on the amount of fuel burn. 
 
From a service planning point of view, the strategy to get the most of free permits goes 
through increasing the total 2010 RTKs, either adding capacity to certain routes, playing with 
pricing policies to stimulate demand or increasing the number of direct flights, reducing 
intermediate stops. For the ETS, fuel consumption and RTKs are accounted only for the last 
segment before landing or the first one after takeoff. For example, a Delhi - Rome flight gets 
its total fuel consumption and RTKs accounted, while a Delhi – Istanbul – Rome only 
includes the Istanbul – Rome figures. 
 
A second possibility to increase the number of performed RTKs depends on the way of 
calculating that magnitude. MRV regulation indicates a single way to calculate flight 
distances, consistent in taking the WGS84 system (ICAO model to compute orthodromic 
distances between two airports) and adding 95 kilometre per flight to compensate the 
difference between the optimum flight path and the actual one, assuming that, in percentage 
of distance, short flights deviates more than long ones. 
 
Payload calculation is more complicated because passengers are not actually weighted and 
each airline uses its own estimations for evaluate the weight of a passenger and his 
baggage. On this issue the airlines have two options: 
- using the standard weight and balance sheet for aircraft dispatching, with its 
specific values of passenger weights or, 
- by default, using a single figure of 100 kg per passenger and his baggage 
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The experience shows that long range passengers use to travel with heavier baggage than 
medium range ones and airlines recognise it by applying higher weights in their 
transcontinental flights, but here there is an opportunity to increase RTK in the year 2010 
adopting the most advantageous option (the heavier one), with the purpose of achieving 
more market share and receiving more permits for the year 2012. It is not allowed to use 
both procedures during the same calculation period, then it is convenient to make a global 
evaluation for checking which one gives the best result. 
 
3. POLICIES FOR THE YEAR 2012 
 
Once the airline has received its initial permit allocation by April 2011, the emissions of the 
flights to the EU in the 2012 program should be compared with the permits on hand in order 
to know whether there is sufficient coverage or the airline will be forced to buy additional 
permits. 
 
In the first case, when no more permits are needed, the airline has to explore the conditions 
for selling the excess of permits of its property or, if it is forecasted an increase in traffic for 
2013, evaluate the convenience of keeping them up to the next year. One interesting aspect 
of the system is the immediate financial liquidity of the permits, the value of which fluctuates 
in the stock markets, and allows airlines buy and sell with no practical limit. At the moment an 
airline receive a permit allocation, it may sell those permits in the market to improve its cash 
position. In the extreme case of a non EU airline receiving permits and deciding not to flight 
to the EU in 2012, those permits can be sold and the airline will account an extraordinary 
profit in its books. 
 
In spite of this advantage, airline CO2 permits can`t be sold to anybody. Carbon market is 
basically covering allowances of emitters included in the Kyoto Protocol. International 
aviation emissions are not integrated in the Protocol and are not Kyoto permits. The ETS 
regime allow airlines to buy Kyoto permits from other industries and using them to offset their 
emissions but aviation permits can`t be used by other industries and are only valid to offset 
aviation emissions. It is assumed that airlines will be needing more permits than the total of 
aviation permits created and there will not be problems to trade them among the different 
carriers. At the end, the market will develop the right interchange equation between Kyoto 
and non Kyoto permits. 
 
This feature has a great relevancy for network planning and route evaluation. Reducing 
flights to the EU avoids the cost of permits or creates a profit by selling them, always 
dependent on the carbon market price. Up to now, that price has been extremely unstable, 
as it is shown in the figure 1, representing the evolution of the price of the CO2 ton at the 
initial phase of the European ETS.  
 
The first ETS year in Europe was 2005 and prices went up from an initial 8€ per ton in 
December 2004 up to 30€ per ton. In April 2006, the participating companies deliver their 
permits for compensating their emissions and the market discovered that permit allocation 
had been very generous and there was an excess of permits in the market. As a 
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consequence, the price fell down to 10€. The unbalance on free permits was partially 
corrected in the subsequent years, but prices never came back to the high values. In recent 
years, the price moves around 12-15€ per ton. 
 
 
 
          Figure 1.- Fluctuation of the CO2 ton in the world stock market. 
 
 
The effect of airline participation in the ETS should increase prices because the airline 
industry is supposed to be a net buyer of emission allowances, as the traffic growth 
overpasses the improvement of efficiency and the proportion of free permits is reduced in 
favor of more auctioning. 
 
A surprising fact is the scarcity of trustable statistics on aviation fuel efficiency, being normal 
the use of fuel burn figures without the adequate correspondence with Revenue Ton-
Kilometre data. To solve this problem, in the year 2000, the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) started to monitor the actual evolution of that variable, asking for data 
directly to its associated companies, and compared them with the theoretical ICAO and IEA 
(International Energy Agency). The results of the six year comparison is shown in the figure 
2. IATA members move over 90% of international air traffic and around 80% of total traffic 
and the results can be considered representative. 
 
The data indicate that the industry can achieve an impressive improvement of efficiency 
close to 2% per year, but the traffic growth during that period averaged 5% per year, leaving 
the airlines in the need of buying permits to compensate the extra traffic. 
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c  
Figure 2.- Projected and actual fuel use efficiency by IATA airlines 
 
It is obvious that improving the efficiency parameter is key for mitigating the ETS cost. One 
important element for this purpose would be increasing the load factor of the flights, 
producing more RTKs with a minor additional amount of fuel burn. The other would be 
changing the composition of the fleet, introducing more modern and fuel efficient models. 
 
For the non EU airlines, changing the composition of the fleet does not necessarily mean 
buying or leasing new models, but, in some cases, modify the existing aircraft rotation, 
assigning the better fuel economy ones to the EU routes. The advantages may be 
technological or simply by scale factor. All the other things the same, larger aircraft offer 
higher fuel efficiency. 
 
An alternative method for reducing the amount of emissions included in the ETS consist in 
reshaping the flight network to shorten those flights touching EU points in 2012, doing exactly 
the opposite than in 2010. In this year, the target was increase RTKs by doing longer flights 
without intermediate stops. In 2012, the goal is achieving low CO2 figures by reducing the 
length of the flights. 
 
The geographical position of the non EU airline applying this method may be very influential. 
Airports close to the EU territory, like Istanbul for flights from the East or Casablanca for 
flights from the South may be excellent intermediate points to stop and limit the fuel burn in 
the last part of the total itinerary. Even places like the Middle East qualify as good scales for 
very long flights, like those coming from Australia or South East Asia. This policy has some 
limitations on commercial fields, as the passengers prefer nonstop flights, and on economy 
terms, because the selected stopover needs to be at a reasonable distance of the direct 
route for avoiding excessive detours and cost penalties. 
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The European system works with the amount of fuel burn per flight, independently of the 
place in which the kerosene has been uploaded. With this philosophy, tankering practices 
are useless. In the case of the US proposed system, in which the permit price is included in 
the delivered, taking more fuel than needed in a place not covered by the ETS might be 
considered, depending on the length of the flights and the price of the permits (see ref. [8])  
 
4. BUYING ADDITIONAL PERMITS  
 
If the number of assigned permits is insufficient and the airline decides to go on with its 2012 
flight program, there will be a need of obtaining more emission allowances. That can be done 
in three different ways: 
- participating in the auction of 15% of historical emissions, distributed in this way 
- buying aviation permits to other airlines or Kyoto permits in the market 
- Using other mechanisms offered by the Kyoto Protocol to compensate the 
emissions excess, like Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanisms 
 
The first option is still to be defined by the EU Commission. The key point is to decide 
whether there will be an auction, including all the quota, or it will be fragmented in 27 
auctions, one per EU member State. The price of these permits should be lower than the 
market price of Kyoto permits for being competitive. Otherwise, it would be more 
advantageous going to the general market. 
 
This second option, buying in the general market, might have some positive aspects because 
the permit is easier to resale and the quotation is more transparent. The trading uses to be 
done by specialised agents who develop negotiation platforms for CO2 emission allowances, 
in order to provide large, medium and small companies with an internet based system for the 
negotiation of emission allowances in a way that is safe, efficient, transparent and 
egalitarian. 
 
In Europe there are several active markets like the European Market ECX, the Austrian 
Market EXAA, the French Market Powernext Carbon, the German Market EEX, the Norway 
Nord Pool and the Mediterranean Market SendeCO2. Other international markets are USA 
CCX, the Montreal Climate Exchange and the Japanese markets. 
 
The third possibility is offsetting emissions by entering in Joint Implementation programs or 
Clean Development Mechanisms. The emissions saved in these programs must compensate 
the airline emissions. Joint Implementation (JI) are transnational programs in which the 
partners share the obtained permits, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is gathering 
permits through projects performed in other countries. JI is reserved for EU countries 
cooperation while JDM is fully open to non EU participants. 
 
The big trouble JI and CDM is the certification of the emissions savings. For example, 
financing the replacement of an old technology coal energy generator by a modern 
technology gas powered one. The project needs to be revised by an independent audit 
company with the purpose of certify the investment amount and the resultant emissions 
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decrease. The process is complicate, time consuming and expensive and only very big 
projects, develop by huge companies, reach a scale large enough to compensate the audit 
cost. 
 
The way of making work CDM projects for medium or small companies is based on creating 
a company to launch the large project and sell participations to groups of enterprises in the 
same activity, like airlines groups. IATA has started a program for financing a large 
reforestation project and offers to its member airlines the possibility of purchasing permits. 
 
The viability of JDM depends heavily on the evolution of carbon markets. As project 
evaluation, investment finance and operational planning require a certain level of 
anticipation, the cost of each saved CO2 is predetermined and the whole project may be a 
total failure if market prices are lower. 
 
A big part of the price development incertitude comes from the doubts on the pace of 
demand recovering after the fast traffic level fall down after the financial crash happened in 
the summer of 2008. The expansion of the crisis ran through the whole 2009, producing the 
deepest demand reduction since the Second World War. 
 
Among the impressive quantity of negative news on airline business, there was a good one: 
the aviation emissions included in the future European ETS decreased by an estimated 7% 
in 2009 with respect to the previous year. Table 1 shows calculated CO2 figures of the top 30 
emitters in 2009 and their respective 2008 figures. 
 
Emissions are reduced 6.8% average, with airlines like Alitalia, Delta, SAS or Singapore 
airlines decreasing more than 20%. Some of the growing figures in the table are misleading. 
For example, the 25% growth of Vueling is the consequence of the merger between that 
company and the other Spanish low cost carrier, Clickair. Other airlines in this category, like 
Air Berlin or easyJet offer modest increases and the fastest growing low cost carrier in 
Europe, the Irish company Ryanair keeps practically stable. 
 
Traffic figures of the last three months (December 2009, January and February 2010) seem 
to indicate a progressive recovery of the demand, stronger in Asia, Middle East and Latin 
America than in North America and Europe. If this trend continues, non EU carriers will be in 
a very advantageous position to increase 2010 TRKs and gaining more permits than their 
slower recovery North American and European counterparts.  
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Table 1.- Variation of CO2 emissions 2009-2008 for the top 30 airline emitters in the 
European ETS 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Non EU airlines may opt for applying the above explained procedures only for those flights 
included in the ETS, segregating them from the rest of the network. Without disregarding 
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those cases in which the number of selected flights is very small, like a daily flight, ETS 
offers a great opportunity to increase the efficiency of both the operating and the 
administrative procedures, building up an accurate and audited control of payloads and fuel 
loads that may help a great deal into the decision making process of airline management. 
 
To most of the non EU airlines the economic penalty of the ETS will be very modest at the 
beginning. The 2008-2009 financial crisis has drastically reduced air traffic growth and the 
figure for historical emissions is very likely to be similar to the corresponding 2010 figure. 
This is a key issue, because a majority of forecasts signals towards a fast growth recovery 
after that year, leading to a situation where granted permits cover most of 2012 airline needs 
but creates a huge deficit in the following years, when the number of free permits is 
progressively reduced. This makes very important early action to ensure a good starting 
position since 2010. 
 
In comparative terms, non EU airlines flying long range wide bodies enjoy some advantages 
with respect to EU airlines mixing narrow and wide bodies and medium and long range 
flights. Aircraft efficiency of wide bodies flying long range is higher, in the fuel consumed by 
RTK terms, and depending on the load factor and the range of the flights may grant up to 
20% more permits than same traffic volume with a medium range fleet. 
 
The last element but not the least of the ETS strategy is the participation in the carbon 
market. There is no clear picture of the future situation of the CO2 price. The historical 
experience offers an up and downs trajectory, moved by initial unbalances of the system and 
speculative movements by hedging funds. Even the auctioning procedure for the initial 15% 
of historical emissions is still to be defined. A prudent airline should keep an eye on future 
developments, acquire the knowledge needed and consider participation in collective 
systems of size enough to take leadership on carbon funds or Clean Development 
mechanisms specifically applicable to aviation. 
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